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Citizens have many different reasons to support or oppose government responsibility in the 
domain of social welfare. They may want to restrict social rights for undeserving or deviant 
beneficiaries, they may want to safeguard their own financial interests, they may want to exclude 
immigrants and other outgroups from welfare coverage, or they may express solidarity with 
fellow citizens in precarious life situations. Such reasons are likely to determine the extent to 
which citizens consider government institutions to be responsible for handling social issues such 
as inequality, unemployment and public health. The match between citizens’ expectations and 
actual government intervention in social issues then shapes the legitimacy of welfare 
arrangements, thus providing the social foundation of collective responsibility. 
We use the generic term of normative beliefs to subsume individually held, but 
socially shared values, perceptions and expectations which provide normative support for welfare 
attitudes, understood as policy preferences in the domain of government responsibility and 
redistribution of economic resources. Four issues related to normative beliefs are addressed in 
this chapter. The first issue concerns the structure of the beliefs which are associated with welfare 
attitudes. We suggest that four basic categories of beliefs account for the normative foundation 
of welfare intervention, organised as a function of different conceptions of social order. Second, 
we investigate the social contexts which give rise to these normative beliefs by studying how level 
of education and perceived vulnerability impacts normative beliefs and welfare attitudes. A third 
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question concerns the nature of the relationship between normative beliefs and welfare attitudes. 
We propose that social psychological processes of differentiation and boundary definition 
provide the normative foundations of welfare legitimacy. And fourth, we investigate contextual 
variation of these beliefs by examining how membership in different European countries 
moderates the role of normative beliefs as organizing principles of welfare attitudes.  
In order to tackle these issues, we develop a normative approach to welfare attitudes 
that sets out to explain the psychological and cultural processes which account for the 
relationship between social position, normative beliefs and policy attitudes. Two empirical 
strategies will be used: First, we propose a mediation model of welfare attitudes with individual 
social position as the independent variable, welfare attitudes as the outcome variable and 
theoretically defined normative beliefs as mediating variables between social position and policy 
attitudes. Second, we investigate the relationships between normative beliefs and welfare attitudes 
as a function of national and institutional contexts, first by comparing the impact of normative 
beliefs as a function of welfare regimes, and second through multilevel modelling. 
Cultural approaches to welfare attitudes  
The question of public legitimacy of social government intervention has attracted 
much recent scholarly interest (e.g., Aalberg, 2003; Andreß and Heien, 2001; Blekesaune and 
Quadagno, 2003; Mau, 2003; Mau and Veghte, 2007; van Oorschot, 2006; Staerklé et al., 2007; 
Svallfors, 2006). Many accounts of perceived government legitimacy rely on the assumption that 
self-interest is a key driving force of welfare attitudes (e.g., Hall and Soskice, 2001; Rehm, 2007). 
Yet, this rationalist view of human motivation whereby citizens support only those policies they 
benefit from has been challenged by researchers who emphasize the importance of normative, 
moral and cultural factors in explaining political attitudes (e.g., Mau, 2004; Sears and Funk, 1990; 
van Oorschot, 2006). A cultural approach to welfare attitudes, for example, suggests that 
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members of a cultural community elaborate, share and perpetuate meanings of the role of 
government in their everyday lives (see Clarke, 2004; Chamberlayne et al., 1999; van Oorschot, 
2006). The encompassing Nordic welfare states have for example been explained with the 
historically prevailing Lutheran model of the relationship between a caring central authority and 
citizens who willfully subject themselves to this authority (Soerensen, 1998). Self-interest itself 
may be such a cultural norm rather than an inherently individual motivation (Miller, 1999b). In 
this view, self-interest is perceived by citizens (and maybe also by large parts of the “elite” such as 
policy makers and researchers) of the Western world not only as the most “normal” explanation 
of human behavior (“everybody is self-interested”), but also as the most appropriate justification 
(“it’s good to be self-interested”).  
A cultural analysis of policy attitudes also focuses on widely shared beliefs about 
beneficiary groups and cultural patterns of perceived deservingness. In such analyses, the impact 
of normative images of the poor (Geremek, 1994) and perceptions of causes of poverty are 
studied as policy attitude determinants (e.g., Sachweh et al., 2007; van Oorschot, 2000). One 
widespread cultural belief about the origins of social hardship is welfare dependency according to 
which government intervention is actually the problem rather than the solution to the dire 
consequences of life course misfortunes. In line with neo-conservative ideology (e.g., Murray, 
1984), overly generous welfare policies are claimed to lead to attitudes of passivity, immorality, 
selfishness, consumerism and hedonism. Notwithstanding the fact that research has not been 
able to empirically uncover such deleterious effects of welfare states, cultural beliefs about 
welfare dependency remain powerful rhetorical devices to justify welfare retrenchment. 
This cultural focus on welfare attitudes reflects contemporary value pluralism (e.g., 
Young, 2007) which also guides our normative approach. In a far-reaching analysis on the 
cultural values underlying welfare attitudes, Feldman and Zaller (1992) show that political 
cultures of countries provide people with ideological values which often conflict with each other. 
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In their analysis of policy attitudes in the United States, they describe a central conflict between 
the cultural values of individualism and humanitarianism, a classical distinction many authors 
have referred to, for example in terms of a conflict between capitalism vs. democracy (McClosky 
and Zaller, 1984), the protestant work ethic vs. egalitarianism-humanitarianism (Katz and Hass, 
1988), or freedom vs. equality (Rokeach, 1973). The value pluralism of contemporary political 
cultures gives rise to widespread attitudinal ambivalence which is therefore not the result of 
lacking political competence: “[…] conflict and ambivalence is interpreted not as confusion, 
inconsistency, or lack of sophistication but as a problem of reconciling the multiple values, 
beliefs, and principles simultaneously present in the political culture” (Feldman and Zaller, 1992: 
270). A comparative analysis of welfare attitudes should take into account that contemporary 
political cultures across different national contexts are characterized by a large array of competing 
cultural values and models of social organization (Hochschild, 1981). Such value configurations 
represent normative reference markers which feed and orient lay political thinking (Young, 2007) 
and are presumably present in any democratic society as “ideological dilemmas” (Billig, 1989). 
Yet, a cultural approach may be prone to a conceptual pitfall when individuals are 
seen as unidirectionally “influenced” by cultural beliefs which are supposedly shared to an equal 
degree by members of a given social group. Instead, it seems more fruitful to consider such 
cultural beliefs as the product of everyday practice, social experience and membership in social 
groups, and thus as organizing principles of social relations and social order (Staerklé, 2009).  
A normative approach to welfare attitudes 
The normative approach to welfare attitudes we offer in this chapter is based on classic work in 
European social psychology (Doise, 1986; Moscovici, 1961/1976; Tajfel, 1978; 1981), in 
particular social representations theory which was initiated in the 1960’s by Serge Moscovici (see 
Augoustinos et al., 2006; Bauer and Gaskell, 2008; Doise et al., 1993; Moscovici, 2000). At the 
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most general level, social representations are collective definitions of reality, made up by shared 
normative beliefs which enable communication, consent and dissent within and between social 
groups (Elcheroth et al., in press; Staerklé et al., in press). Social representations are not 
“external” to individuals, in the sense that they would exert an “influence” on them. Rather, 
individuals’ thinking is based on representations without which they could not make sense of 
social realities and communicate with each other about these realities. Social representations 
therefore organize social relationships by providing normative reference knowledge—expressed 
as “values”, “beliefs”, or “identities”—which make up the symbolic environment of citizens and 
their various ingroups.  
 A social representational account of welfare attitudes conceptualizes lay thinking as 
based on rules and principles different from formal expert thinking. Welfare attitudes are seen as 
part of political lay thinking (Staerklé, 2009) which is fed by widely disseminated ideas and shared 
understandings regarding social order and the just distribution of resources within a society (see 
Mau, 2004), in particular as a function of the perceived entitlement of potential beneficiary 
groups. Normative beliefs are thus seen as collectively elaborated and shared knowledge that 
reflects different models of organizing a society, that is, conceptions of social order.  
In its most basic sense, the notion of social order refers to the norms, rules and laws 
which define our living together as a group, as a community or as a society. Welfare attitudes 
should therefore be understood in relation to the normative beliefs which underlie social order 
and make the social bond possible (van Oorschot and Komter, 1998). But because democratic 
dissent can always challenge an established way to organize the society, any order may be 
contested and its stability can never be taken for granted. Such competing models of social order 
prescribe different types of relationships between individual members, their reference groups and 
the institutions and authorities which govern them. Some forms of social order, for example, 
emphasize the collective interests of the group to which individual rights and duties are 
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subordinated, whereas others value individual rights which have priority over community rights. 
It is our assumption that citizens refer to such competing models of social order when taking up 
a stance towards social government intervention. 
Hence, we view normative beliefs such as egalitarianism, authoritarianism or welfare 
dependency as reflecting specific conceptions of social order debated in the public sphere rather 
than as individual values or even personality dimensions. The differential endorsement of these 
beliefs reflects the support or the rejection of normative models of social order put forward by 
political groups, policy makers and other voices heard in the political debate. Normative beliefs 
therefore function as organizing principles (Bourdieu, 1984; Doise et al., 1993) of welfare 
attitudes which crystallize competing definitions of social order. The relative individual 
importance of these representations of social order as foundations of welfare attitudes varies 
according to one’s position in the social hierarchy. In our mediation model, we focus on 
individual variation of conceptions of social order as a function of education and perceived 
vulnerability (see Lewin-Epstein et al., 2003).  
The normative beliefs underlying welfare attitudes will be organized on the basis of 
the model of lay conceptions of social order (Staerklé, 2009). Originally developed to analyze the 
Swiss Welfare State Survey (Staerklé et al., 2007), this model distinguishes four domains of shared 
normative beliefs called Moral order, Free market, Social diversity and Structural inequality. 
These domains refer to four prototypical forms of social order which allow integrating various 
belief items contained in ESS 4 into a single, theory-based framework of normative beliefs. On 
the individual level, these conceptions are not mutually exclusive, but rather combine in multiple 
ways. 
The model assumes that the basic psychological process underlying normative beliefs 
is differentiation between social categories (Tajfel, 1978) and boundary definition (Lamont and 
Molnar, 2002). Through differentiation, the multiple boundaries between positively connoted, 
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deserving social categories and negatively connoted, undeserving categories are subjectively 
defined. Differentiation thereby translates value conflicts at a societal level into a psychological 
process which sets apart positively evaluated ingroups and negatively evaluated outgroups, 
organizes perceptions of cleavages within the society, and ultimately determines perceived 
entitlements of social categories. Such a view is in line with political theory which emphasizes the 
central role of social antagonisms in democratic politics (Mouffe, 1993). This perspective suggests 
that policy decisions are basically strategies to regulate relations between groups and individuals 
representing contrasting values. Such antagonisms are also thought to be at the core of normative 
beliefs. 
The four conceptions of social order—Moral order, Free market, Social diversity and 
Structural inequality—represent the outcome of the crossing of two fundamental polarities which 
organize normative beliefs as: (a) normative vs. categorical differentiation which occur in (b) 
social contexts defined either by identity (symbolic) or positional (material) concerns (see Table 
5.1). Normative differentiation (Moral order and Free market) establishes boundaries between 
norm-conforming and norm-violating individuals, while categorical differentiation (Social 
diversity and Structural inequality) creates boundaries between groups defined by ascribed group 
membership (Duckitt, 2001; Kreindler, 2005). In the process of normative differentiation, social 
cleavages are understood as the result of wilful individual actions, for example in normative 
beliefs which imply a distinction between lazy and hard-working people such as welfare 
dependency. The meaning of these actions is defined with respect to perceived conformity with 
important ingroup values, in this example the work ethic, and the boundaries are represented as 
permeable (anyone can work hard if they only want to). The process of categorical 
differentiation, in turn, is reflected in normative beliefs which pit against each other social 
categories defined through ascribed membership. Boundaries are therefore constructed as 
impermeable, such as in relations between ethnic and cultural minorities and majorities (as in the 
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normative belief of ethnocentrism) or between subordinate and dominant groups (as in beliefs of 
social dominance). These two forms of differentiation processes can either rely on identity-based, 
non-quantifiable criteria (Moral order and Social diversity), or on material and quantifiable 
attributes (Free market and Structural inequality). This second polarity thus opposes boundary 
definitions related to social identities and symbolic motives on the one hand, and to social 
position, social hierarchy and instrumental motives on the other. 
The four conceptions represent simplified models of social order, and the normative 
beliefs which reflect these conceptions are deployed and debated in the political arena, for 
example by interest groups who seek to define and impose specific meanings of social categories 
(such as the “lazy unemployed”). By specifying an emblematic antagonism for each type of social 
order, the model seeks to account for the key role played by stereotypical images of beneficiary 
groups in welfare attitude construction. Four types of perceived entitlements are defined by the 
model. The perceived legitimacy of welfare benefits is based on similarity and value conformity in 
the Moral order conception, equity and individual contributions in the Free market conception, 
ascribed group membership in the Social diversity conception, and social position in the 
Structural inequality conception. The analysis of the relationships between normative beliefs and 
welfare attitudes are presumed to provide indirect evidence of how perceived entitlements lead to 
supporting or opposing intervention in the domain of social welfare. 
Normative beliefs are expected to interact with the institutional environment which 
is at the same time the source and the product of shared definitions of reality: while institutional 
arrangements grow out of pre-existing belief and value systems, they also give rise to new beliefs 
and consolidate existing ones. Analyses of the match between collective levels of support for 
welfare arrangements and national welfare regimes are based on the assumption that national 
welfare institutions exert a socializing and norm-stabilizing force which influences public opinion 
(Andreß and Heien, 2001). Our approach shares the important assumption with such normative 
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institutionalist approaches that the norms and rules of institutions shape the actions of those 
acting within them (e.g., Mau, 2004; Rothstein, 1998). But in contrast to Mau’s (2004) 
institutionalist model which takes national arrangements (weak vs. strong conditionality and 
comprehensive vs. residual level of welfare provision) as the defining dimensions of normative 
conceptions of reciprocity, our model of lay conceptions of social order takes a more bottom-up 
approach based on normative beliefs held by citizens and the psychological processes implied by 
these beliefs. Yet, our normative approach also assumes a homology between social-institutional 
and cognitive-psychological regulation.  
Accordingly, perceived welfare legitimacy (or illegitimacy) should be based on 
normative beliefs, evidenced with correlations between welfare attitudes and normative beliefs). 
These relationships are expected to vary according to the normative environments provided by 
different national and institutional contexts. We empirically analyze such institutional variation, 
first with comparisons of the role of normative beliefs in predicting welfare attitudes across types 
of welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Second, we employ multilevel models to test the 
impact of two continuous country-level variables, the proportion of social expenditure of a 
country and its level of unemployment. Social expenditure was chosen because in strong welfare 
states the question of defining boundaries between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of social 
provisions is likely to be a central political question, and thus relevant for the analysis of public 
welfare legitimacy. The model of lay conceptions of social order appears suitable to explore this 
issue since it conceptualizes normative beliefs as strategies of differentiation and boundary 
definition which support or undermine the legitimacy to government intervention. Level of 
unemployment, in turn, should affect the extent to which citizens are personally aware of social 
risk and uncertainty, through their own experience of unemployment and familiarity with 
unemployed persons around them. In order to provide more detailed rationales as to how the 
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country-level features should affect the legitimizing role of normative beliefs, we now move on to 
examine separately the four conceptions of social order.  
 
Table 5.1 about here  
 
Four conceptions of social order 
In the conception of Moral order, social order is based on the principle of morality and 
conformity with consensual and established norms and values (as in Etzioni’s, (1994) , 
conservative communitarianism). Social order is explained with citizens’ respect for common 
values such as morality, self-reliance and discipline: the good citizens are those who represent 
“our” values, whereas those who disrespect them, with deviant and disorderly behavior, are 
categorized as “bad” citizens. This form of social order is supported and justified with 
authoritarian modes of thinking, characterized by intolerance of deviance and submissiveness to 
authorities (see Duckitt, 1989).  
Two rationales linking authoritarian beliefs to welfare attitudes seem plausible. 
Firstly, an authoritarian view of social order may be incompatible with the endorsement of 
extensive government responsibility in that repression of deviance, rather than redistribution, is 
seen as the correct answer to social problems. In this view, deviant and non-conforming 
individuals are not considered worthy of state support, leading to a conditional view of welfare 
and lower overall levels of welfare support. Some authors have already noted a current tendency 
in many West European countries to complement or even substitute social welfare schemes with 
punitive and repressive policies (see Garland, 2001; Young, 1999). In sum, the first hypothesis 
suggests that a negative relationship between authoritarian beliefs and welfare support would 
imply a perceived incompatibility between social and repressive government action (“the more 
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authoritarian, the less social government intervention”, H1a). We would expect to find such a relationship 
particularly in West European liberal contexts where high levels of social expenditure have come 
under political attack from neo-liberal movements and where the shift from social to penal 
regulation of social problems has been most clearly evidenced (Wacquant, 2009). 
An alternative rationale suggests that endorsing both authoritarian beliefs and 
extensive government responsibility may not necessarily be mutually exclusive. A positive 
relationship (“the more authoritarian, the more social government intervention”, H1b), reflects support for a 
strong government which is expected both to help people in need and to deal effectively with 
crime and other forms of social insecurity. We therefore expect the relationship between 
authoritarianism and government responsibility to be more strongly positive in national contexts 
with high levels of social insecurity, in the form of low social expenditure and high 
unemployment, compared to contexts with relatively less social insecurity.  
A second aspect of the moral order conception concerns the extent to which people 
perceive others as trustworthy group members. Social trust has been shown to be central for 
coordination and cooperation within groups (Deutsch, 1973; Putnam, 1993).  We can therefore 
expect that social distrust should lead to a lower willingness to support resource redistribution 
within the group or society (“the more distrust, the less social government intervention”, H2a). An 
alternative and more counterintuitive hypothesis in light of the research on the positive effects of 
trust on welfare legitimacy (e.g., Rothstein, 1998), however, suggests a positive relationship (“the 
more distrust, the more social government intervention”, H2b), interpreted as a response to contexts where 
people feel they cannot trust others and therefore need the state to compensate for the weakened 
social ties through extensive government programmes. Hence, we expect the relationship 
between distrust and government responsibility to be positive in contexts of high social 
insecurity, that is, where social expenditure is low and unemployment high. 
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The Free market conception of social order consists of beliefs about competitive 
motivations which take productivity and individual performance as the basis of normative 
boundary definition. On grounds of economically liberal principles, free market thinking assumes 
that the basic human motivation is self-interest (Walster et al., 1987). Meritocratic criteria 
differentiate lazy “losers” from productive “winners”, and individuals are expected to engage in 
competitive relations with each other. Equity policies (such as individualized insurance regimes) 
as well as means-tested schemes are the main policy types in this conception. Alleged welfare 
dependency is therefore a central normative belief in the free market conception. This free 
market conception of welfare is evidenced with a negative relationship between welfare 
dependency and government responsibility (“the lazier the beneficiaries, the less government”, H3 ). We 
expect this free market conception to be widespread across European countries, but nevertheless 
anticipate that alleged welfare dependency plays a more prominent role in welfare attitude 
construction in extensive welfare states where unemployment is low because in such contexts 
welfare abuse is likely to figure more in media and political discourse. Hence, the relationship 
between welfare dependency and social government intervention should be more strongly 
negative in these contexts.  
The conception of social diversity relies upon ascribed group membership and is 
based on an a priori distinction between social groups, in particular between national, ethnic and 
cultural groups. It thereby provides a conceptual framework for integrating beliefs concerning 
cultural diversity and multiculturalism in the study of welfare attitudes .This conception is more 
complex than the conceptions of moral order and free market, because normative beliefs in 
contemporary societies may depict group differences as either positive, for example in 
multiculturalism and in movements defending rights of particular groups (see Isin and Wood, 
1999), or as negative, for example in racist and ethnocentric thinking. We expect to find mostly 
negative relationships between ethnocentrism and government responsibility across European 
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countries (“the more ethnocentric, the less welfare”, H4). Such negative relationships are assumed to 
denote a motivation to limit welfare coverage of immigrant and other minority groups, a process 
amply illustrated in the U.S. context where racial prejudice towards Blacks is a major driving force 
of opposition to welfare (Gilens, 1999).  We therefore expect the relationship between 
ethnocentrism and government responsibility to be more negative in national contexts with high 
levels of social expenditure where immigration is more common and also more politicized 
(Castles and Miller, 2009). 
In the final conception, normative beliefs are structured by perceived social 
hierarchies of status and power, that is, by structural inequalities. In this conception, boundaries 
are drawn between allegedly impermeable subordinate and dominant social categories. These 
categories are seen as being in a competitive relation of negative interdependence with each 
other: the demands by subordinate groups directly threaten the well-being of the dominant 
groups. As in the social diversity conception, normative beliefs promoted by politically active 
groups and individuals can either portray structural inequalities as legitimate, fair and “normal”, 
or on the contrary as illegitimate and unfair. In order to justify social cleavages, individuals may 
for example endorse beliefs put forward by groups which claim moral, social and intellectual 
superiority of those in privileged positions (i.e., “legitimizing myths” in social dominance theory,  
Sidanius and Pratto, 1999), or they may support egalitarian beliefs which consider class 
differences as the illegitimate result of social reproduction and inherited privileges (Bourdieu, 
1984). Therefore, individuals promoting an egalitarian social order are likely to defend 
redistributive policies, in particular progressive tax policies and universalist social welfare 
programs (Rothstein, 1998). Welfare legitimacy following the logic of this conception is 
evidenced with a positive relationship between egalitarianism and government responsibility (“the 
more egalitarian, the more welfare, H5), denoting a motivation to expand welfare coverage to 
subordinate groups. Since the need to address inequalities is strongest in countries with high 
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levels of social insecurity, we expect this relationship to be more positive in countries with 
relatively low levels of social expenditure and high levels of unemployment. 
Analytic Model 
An analytic model will guide the treatment of the ESS IV data on 28 European countries. In a 
first step, we examine the dimensionality and the factorial structure of five normative beliefs 
defined by the model of lay conceptions of social order (Authoritarianism, Distrust, Welfare 
dependency, Ethnocentrism and Egalitarianism). In a second step, we examine the impact of 
social position (assessed with level of education and perceived material vulnerability) on the five 
conceptions of social order (path a in Figure 5.1). Multilevel regression analyses then investigate 
the joint impact of social position (path b) and normative beliefs (path c) on government 
responsibility. Next, we present a mediation model which analyses the indirect effects of social 
position on welfare attitudes, mediated by normative beliefs for all countries together (paths a + 
c). In order to examine country-level variation of normative welfare legitimacy, we first look at 
differences and similarities in normative mechanisms across welfare regimes. Then, in the final 
step, we test cross-level interactions to explore the extent to which the relationships between 
normative beliefs and welfare attitudes are moderated by two country-level variables, that is, 
social expenditure and level of unemployment (path d).  
 
Figure 5.1 about here 
 
Data and measures 
We use the complete ESS IV dataset (third release) which in May 2010 included 28 countries (N 
= 54’988). Variables were constructed in order to test the mediation model presented in Figure 
15 
 
5.1. We first describe the social position variables, then the conceptions of social order, and 
finally the two dependent variables. 
Level of education and perceived material vulnerability were used as variables 
assessing respondents’ position in the social structure. Level of education was chosen because it is a 
reliable and objective indicator of social position. It is highly correlated with other indicators of 
social position such as household income (r = .38), and has the advantage of having few missing 
values (contrary to household income). We assume that the level of education determines to a 
large extent the social position of individuals in terms of income, status and prestige (Bourdieu, 
1984). A single item with seven levels of education was used: (1) not completed primary 
education (3.2 % of the sample); (2) primary or first stage of basic schooling (12.4 %); (3) lower 
secondary or second stage of basic schooling (19.4 %); (4) upper secondary (34.6 %); (5) post-
secondary, non-tertiary (7.3 %); (6) first stage of tertiary (21.8 %); and (7) second stage of tertiary 
(1.1 %). The item was treated as an ordinal variable. 
The second indicator of social position was material vulnerability which represents a 
subjective interpretation of one’s social position in terms of the likelihood of being exposed to 
different material risks. We call this measure material vulnerability based on the assumption that 
situations of need, scarcity and destitution give rise to feelings of uncertainty, frailty and doubt. 
The indicator is an aggregate scale composed of four items of perceived likelihood of life course 
events with negative material consequences occurring in the next 12 months: (1) becoming 
unemployed and looking for work; (2) having less time for paid work than desired because of the 
care given to family members; (3) not having enough money for household necessities; and (4) 
not receiving health care in case of illness. The average Cronbach’s alpha is .76 and ranges from 
.55 in Denmark to .85 in Cyprus. Material vulnerability has a moderate negative correlation with 
level of education (r = -.13) which suggests that people with lower levels of education are more 
likely to find themselves in situations of material vulnerability.  
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Fifteen items assessing the four conceptions of social order were selected (Table 5.2). The 
Moral order conception was measured with two three-item scales of Authoritarianism and Distrust, 
the Free market conception was represented by a five-item scale of Welfare dependency, the Social 
diversity conception was measured with a three-item Ethnocentrism scale, and the Structural 
inequality conception with a single Egalitarianism item. 
A principal components analysis with VARIMAX rotation confirmed the 
organization of these items into the expected dimensions. In order to formally test the factorial 
structure of these dimensions, a confirmatory factor analysis on four dimensions was then 
performed, without the single egalitarianism item. A reasonably good model fit confirmed the 
four-dimensional structure of the items (CFI = .96; RMSEA = .05). 
These findings point towards the heuristic value of the model of lay conceptions of 
social order which organizes normative beliefs into four general, superordinate categories. The 
structure of normative beliefs is thus defined by differential representations of social order, and 
composed of two moral order sub-dimensions (Authoritarianism and Distrust), one free market 
dimension (Welfare dependency), and one social diversity dimension (Ethnocentrism). The single 
item on egalitarianism is used as a proxy for the structural inequality conception. 
With respect to the overall means of these measures presented in Table 5.2, it can be 
observed that Distrust, Welfare dependency and Ethnocentrism yielded means around the 
respective midpoints of the scales, that is, there was no clear overall tendency to either refute or 
support these beliefs. Authoritarianism, however, was supported by a majority of the respondents 
(means around 4 on a 5-point scale) as was Egalitarianism (mean of 3.72 on a 5-point scale). Yet, 
important differences between countries are hidden behind these overall means. 
Preliminary analyses revealed that the five conceptions were all positively related to 
each other, with the exception of a negative relationship between welfare dependency and 
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egalitarianism (r = -.06). The overall correlations ranged from .10 (between egalitarianism and 
ethnocentrism) to .29 (between ethnocentrism and distrust).  
Government responsibility, our dependent variable, was measured with four items asking 
participants to rate the extent to which governments should be responsible for ensuring the 
following rights.: (1) Job for everyone; (2) Health care for the sick; (3) Standard of living for the 
old and; (4) Standard of living for the unemployed. The global mean of the 4-item summary score 
shows that there is a strong overall tendency to support government intervention (M = 7.81 on a 
10-point scale). A look at the country-by-country statistics reveals that stronger government 
intervention is expected in Central, East and South European countries. 
 
Table 5.2 about here  
 
Normative beliefs as a function of education level and vulnerability 
Membership in social categories defined for example by gender, age, education or class represents 
a proxy for contexts in which common experiences are likely to give rise to shared reference 
knowledge and similar normative beliefs (Bourdieu, 1984). As an example, the socioeconomic 
position of citizens affects their perceptions of social reality (Wegener, 1987) which leads low 
status groups to perceive greater social inequality than high status groups (Aalberg, 2003; Staerklé 
et al., 2007). More generally, people living in unfavorable living conditions are likely to develop 
worldviews in line with their living conditions (Castel, 1995).  
In the present study, we assumed that similar levels of education give rise to relatively 
similar life experiences and thus to common normative beliefs. Likewise, the common experience 
of material vulnerability should lead to specific understandings of social reality. We first carried 
out a series of multilevel regression analyses predicting each of the five conceptions with social 
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positions. In terms of the mediation model presented in Figure 5.1, this step thus investigates the 
relationship between the independent variables and the mediator variables (path a).1 
With respect to age and gender, the findings show that older generations were more likely to 
endorse authoritarianism, welfare dependency, ethnocentrism and egalitarianism, but they were 
somewhat more trusting than younger generations. A similar pattern emerged for gender where 
women scored higher than men on the same conceptions as older generations, with the exception 
of perceived welfare dependency (on which men scored higher) and a much weaker effect on 
ethnocentrism. 
Lower levels of education predicted stronger endorsement of all five conceptions. 
Respondents with lower levels of education were more authoritarian, more distrustful, believed 
more strongly in the debilitating effects of welfare, and considered immigrant presence as a 
threat. That is, they were more likely to draw boundaries between norm-conforming and norm-
violating categories by endorsing beliefs based on normative differentiation and also more likely 
to establish stronger boundaries between national and immigrant categories. At the same time, 
however, they also expressed higher support for egalitarianism, thereby supporting a more 
inclusive boundary definition in the domain social inequality. Material vulnerability, in turn, also 
led to distrust, ethnocentrism and egalitarianism, but was unrelated to authoritarianism and 
negatively related to welfare dependency. Overall, education exerted a stronger pressure on 
opinions than material vulnerability, this difference being particularly striking for authoritarianism 
and welfare dependency. Distrust, however, was better predicted by (high) vulnerability than by 
(low) education level. The strong effects of education level are likely to reflect the fact that 
                                                 
1 Since we were mainly interested in the impact of education and vulnerability within countries, these two variables 
were group-centered within countries (Enders and Tofighi, 2007). By removing between-country variation, this 
procedure produces unbiased estimates of the relationships between the individual level variables as well as of slope 
variances. 
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education determines both cultural and economic capital (Bourdieu, 1984). People with a higher 
level of education are higher up in the social hierarchy, they are less punitive and more trusting, 
less suspicious and less ethnocentric, but also less egalitarian. In short, individuals with high 
status seem more optimistic and more carefree, and less concerned about social issues such as 
delinquency, welfare abuse and immigrant presence. The definition of normative boundaries and 
the perception of social cleavages, in turn, is firmly anchored in low status positions, presumably 
because perceiving society as being structured as a function of clearly differentiated groups 
provides a sense of ontological stability and security which is more likely to be jeopardized in low 
status positions (Young, 1999). 
Normative legitimacy of social government intervention 
We now turn to the central question of the nature of the relationship between social positions 
and normative beliefs on the one hand and welfare attitudes on the other. This analysis provides 
insights into the normative legitimacy of welfare intervention, as it reveals the extent to which 
normative beliefs are associated with the support for or opposition to social government 
intervention. In terms of our analytic model, we look at the effects of the independent and 
mediator variables on the dependent variable. 
In order to control for country-level variance in welfare attitudes, we used multilevel 
regression analysis to test the effects of social positions and conceptions on welfare attitudes. 
Similarly to the analyses in the previous section, both the two social position variables and the 
five conceptions were centered around their country means in order to obtain unbiased and 
comparable estimates of the relationships between individual level variables (Raudenbush and 
Bryk, 2002: 139).  
In the first step, social position variables of education level and material vulnerability 
were introduced together with age and gender (path b). Regarding age and gender, the findings 
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show that elderly people and women expect more government than younger generations and 
men. Concerning the two social position variables, higher levels of education were related to less 
support for government responsibility while material vulnerability predicted stronger 
endorsement of government intervention. In sum, people in dominant social positions were 
more likely to reject redistributive government policies while people in subordinate positions 
endorsed them, a result in line with prior research on welfare attitudes (e.g., Svallfors, 2006). 
 
Table 5.3 about here  
 
In a second step, the five conceptions were introduced in addition to the variables included in the 
first step (path c, controlling for path b). The strongest effects were found for egalitarianism, 
welfare dependency and authoritarianism: Social government intervention was supported with a 
belief based on the illegitimacy of the categorical differentiation between dominant and 
subordinate groups. The negative effect of welfare dependency suggests that normative boundary 
drawing between deserving and undeserving beneficiaries, through the belief in the detrimental 
effects of government help, is a key driving force of opposition to welfare intervention across 
European countries. While these two factors are well-known in welfare attitude research (e.g., van 
Oorschot, 2000), the strongly positive effect of authoritarianism is more intriguing. In line with 
our second rationale (Hypothesis 1b), this finding indicates that social government intervention is 
backed up with (rather than challenged by) authoritarian beliefs which call for obedience and 
punitiveness, and thus for a “strong” government that deals effectively with crime and insecurity. 
On the level of public attitudes, social government thus goes hand in hand with disciplinary 
government (see Wacquant, 1999). Similarly, and again contrary to the usual assumption that 
social trust should support welfare intervention (Rothstein, 1998), distrust in fellow citizens fuels 
calls for social government intervention, but to a lesser degree than authoritarianism. 
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Ethnocentrism, finally, also legitimizes opposition to welfare states (presumably in order to limit 
social rights for immigrants), but since its effect was weaker than any of the other conceptions, its 
role as a generalized normative foundation of welfare opposition seems minor. 
To summarize, the normative legitimacy of European welfare states seems to be 
grounded in three general belief systems: First, welfare legitimacy is grounded in a principled 
position of egalitarianism which considers inequalities between dominant and subordinate groups 
to be a threat to a fair social order. Second, welfare legitimacy is supported with authoritarian 
beliefs according to which governments should play a more extensive role in safeguarding a social 
order threatened by immoral and dangerous people, through repressive policies and an emphasis 
on conformity and obedience. This interpretation is supported by the finding that welfare 
intervention is also associated with generalized distrust and the feeling that one cannot rely on 
fellow citizens for help in difficult life situations. Hence, and at odds with the principle that social 
trust underlies welfare support, people rely on government intervention to compensate for the lack 
of social support around them. Third, welfare legitimacy is undermined by stereotypical and 
stigmatizing images which are put forward in the political debate by advocates of a free market 
organization of social order who aim to restrict social rights for allegedly undeserving citizens. 
These findings underscore the importance of normative boundary drawing in welfare legitimacy, 
since beliefs which imply the differentiation of citizens in terms of their conformity with either 
moral or economic values determine to a large extent perceived welfare legitimacy. Welfare 
legitimacy is thus supported by the authoritarian credo that more punishment is needed for rule-
breakers, while the belief in the ubiquity of free-riding at the expense of hard-working citizens 
undermines welfare legitimacy.  
Mediation model  
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The findings in Table 5.3 also showed that the introduction of the conceptions in the model 
decreased all main effects of the position variables on welfare attitudes, indicating that the impact 
of these positions on welfare attitudes was at least partially mediated by normative beliefs (see 
MacKinnon et al., 2007) . This section specifically addresses this mediating function of normative 
beliefs with structural equation models (SEM), using the global sample of 28 countries. We began 
by testing a hybrid model in which the effects of the two social position variables (education and 
material vulnerability) on welfare attitudes were mediated by the five conceptions, without 
including the direct effects from the position variables to the attitude.2 Figure 5.2 sums up the 
findings for the model. 
 
Figure 5.2 about here 
 
The model resulted in satisfactory fit indices (CFI = .93; RMSEA = .05).3 In line with our 
expectations, the analysis reveals that four of the five conceptions (with the exception of 
ethnocentrism) mediated the effects of both position variables on government responsibility (i.e., 
the indirect effects were significant). As already shown, lower levels of education were related to 
a greater motivation to differentiate individuals and groups on both normative and categorical 
grounds. In the second part of the mediation, from the conceptions to the welfare attitudes, only 
welfare dependency was negatively linked to welfare attitudes, while all other beliefs led to a 
greater demand for social government intervention. 
These mediation analyses thus demonstrate the existence of indirect, mediating 
effects between social positions and welfare attitudes through normative beliefs, in particular 
                                                 
2 The model is a hybrid model because four conceptions as well as the measure of government responsibility were 
included as latent variables. All other variables were included as observed variables. 
3 The models include one proposed modification (a covariation between two of the welfare dependency items).  
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authoritarianism, welfare dependency and egalitarianism. It should be noted, furthermore, that 
individuals with a low level of education display a paradoxical pattern: they endorse authoritarian 
and egalitarian beliefs which legitimize welfare intervention, while at the same time accepting 
beliefs of welfare dependency which undermine welfare legitimacy. The explanation of this 
seeming inconsistency is likely to be found in the strategies low education groups employ to 
make sense of their unfavorable social position: while calling for strong government intervention 
to bring more stability and security to their lives, they also use the work ethic as an identity 
resource to distance themselves from allegedly value-violating and stigmatized groups such as 
welfare beneficiaries (Castel, 1995). This leads low education groups to endorse beliefs of 
perceived abuse and welfare dependency. This pattern was not found among individuals with 
high levels of material vulnerability who perceived less welfare dependency than those with low 
vulnerability. In other words, material vulnerability is related to beliefs that support welfare 
legitimacy, not ones that undermine it. 
Welfare regimes and normative welfare legitimacy 
Up to now, we have analyzed welfare legitimacy on the entire sample of 28 countries. 
There are however strong variations in the revealed mechanisms across countries. Normative 
beliefs concerning social order and attitudes towards welfare states emerge in specific historical 
and institutional contexts. National citizens are therefore likely to share a common normative 
heritage that accounts for greater similarities in the beliefs and attitudes of citizens residing within 
the same country, compared to citizens from different countries. Furthermore, some countries 
are more similar to each other than others, forming clusters of countries. As a first step towards 
understanding the country-level variation in normative welfare legitimacy, we look at differences 
and similarities in normative mechanisms across welfare regimes, by using an adapted version 
from Esping-Andersen’s (1990) well-known typology.  
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The rationale for this analysis is that welfare regimes, much like the conceptions of 
social order, reflect different normative models of social order, and that some correspondence 
can be established between the four conceptions and types of welfare regime. While our analysis 
remains largely exploratory, we nevertheless expect that conceptions of social order should have 
greater predictive weight of welfare attitudes in matching regimes, that is, dominant normative 
beliefs should provide stronger justification of welfare legitimacy. The moral order conception is 
closest to the continental conservative regime with its principles of subsidiarity and private 
welfare responsibility. Therefore authoritarianism and distrust (as indicators of moral order) 
should be important predictors in this regime. The free market conception clearly matches the 
liberal Anglo-Saxon regime with low de-commodification and market-differentiated provisions 
which should be supported by welfare dependency. The social diversity conception is not 
represented in Esping-Andersen’s typology, but it allows investigating the relationship between 
negative perceptions of cultural diversity (ethnocentrism) and welfare provision which has been 
an important focus of recent welfare research (e.g., Banting and Kymlicka, 2006). The structural 
inequality conception, finally, is closely related to the social democratic Nordic regime with high 
de-commodification and strong state intervention, and should therefore be backed up by 
egalitarianism. Eastern and Southern countries are treated as separate types of regimes, 
notwithstanding important institutional variations within these categories.  
We conducted a regression analysis including the two position variables and the five 
normative beliefs (as well as controlling for age, gender, and country), separately in five welfare 
regimes. The countries representing each regime were the same as in chapter 3 (see p. XXX), 
with the only difference that we excluded Switzerland and the Netherlands from the analysis due 
to the mixed character of these regimes. The standardized Beta-coefficients for the effect of each 
normative belief on government responsibility by regime are presented in figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3 about here 
 
Supporting our hypothesis with respect to moral order, the results show that 
authoritarian beliefs had the greatest positive effect on welfare support in continental-
conservative regimes, along with Southern and Eastern regimes (although their effect remains 
positive everywhere). Demands for normative conformity and repressive policies, then, seem to 
go hand in hand with support for social government intervention in all regimes. The effects of 
distrust are less straightforward, as distrust played no role in structuring welfare attitudes in 
Anglo-Saxon, Continental or Southern regimes, but had a negative effect on welfare support in 
Nordic countries, and a positive effect in the Eastern regime. Nevertheless the pattern of 
variation across regimes was similar to the one observed for authoritarianism. In other words, in 
the East, perceiving other people as untrustworthy and self-interested leads to higher demand for 
social state intervention while in the North, distrust is linked to less support for government 
intervention. The results suggest, then, that the effect of trust is dependent on context, as 
formulated in our two alternative hypotheses for moral order.  
The negative effect of welfare dependency on welfare support was strong across all 
regimes, indicating that perceived welfare abuse seems to be a universal reason to oppose social 
government intervention. Similarly, egalitarianism had a universally positive effect on welfare 
support in all regimes, although its effect was (as expected) strongest in the Nordic and weakest 
in the Eastern regime. Finally, ethnocentrism was unrelated to welfare support in Eastern, 
Continental and Anglo-Saxon regimes. Ethnocentrism had a negative effect on support for 
government intervention only in the Nordic and Southern regimes and even there the effects 
were small compared to other normative beliefs.  
A multilevel approach to country-level variation in normative welfare legitimacy 
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A regime-based approach gives a first idea of how normative mechanisms differ 
across groups of countries. Such an approach does not, however, take into account differences 
between countries within the same regime. This can be achieved by multilevel modeling which 
allows testing whether continuous variables measured on the country level account for the 
differences observed between countries. 
 We began by analyzing the extent to which the two country-level characteristics—
public social security expenditure (as percentage of GDP) and national unemployment rate—
affect welfare attitudes. To test their direct effects on welfare attitudes, we conducted separate 
analyses for both country level variables by introducing them into the multilevel models, 
including all individual level variables presented in Table 5.3. Social expenditure had a negative (p < 
.05) and unemployment rate a positive effect (p < .05) on welfare support. In other words, in 
countries with high levels of public social security expenditure, people were less in favor of social 
government intervention. This is likely to be a compensation effect inasmuch as the desired 
government intervention depends on the actual level of government intervention. In countries 
where government already plays an important social role, citizens are less likely to ask for even 
more government responsibility. It should be noted, however, that even in countries where the 
overall mean for government responsibility was among the lowest, it still remained clearly on the 
side of general support for government responsibility. In countries with higher unemployment, 
people were more in favor of government responsibility, suggesting that the experience and 
awareness of the risk of unemployment leads to stronger support for government responsibility.  
In the next step, we were interested in the extent to which the effect of normative 
beliefs in explaining welfare attitudes differs across countries. In order to calculate cross-national 
variation in the relationships between the five conceptions and government responsibility, we ran 
separate models each incorporating the random slope of one conception (together with all the 
individual level main effects presented in Table 5.3). The results of the random slope tests show 
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that the relationship between each of the conceptions and welfare attitudes varied significantly 
across countries, that is, normative beliefs did not have the same effect on welfare attitudes 
across the 28 countries. The slope variance was greatest for authoritarianism, while the slope 
variances of the other four conceptions were smaller in magnitude. This finding suggests that 
welfare legitimacy based on a desire for a strong and repressive government varies greatly across 
countries. The conception with the second largest slope variance was ethnocentrism, indicating that 
countries also differ in the extent to which embracing or rejecting social diversity organizes 
attitudes toward government responsibility.  
In the final step, we investigated the extent to which the two country-level variables 
explain the variations in explanatory power of the five normative beliefs. In order to do so, we 
introduced cross-level interaction terms into the models described above for testing slope 
variations. We tested one model for each conception-country level variable combination (i.e., one 
cross-level interaction at a time), and included in each model the main effect of the country-level 
variable composing the interaction. Table 5.4 summarizes the moderating effects of welfare 
expenditure and unemployment variables on the belief-attitude relationships.  
 
Table 5.4 about here  
 
The results show that, with the exception of welfare dependency, the effects of all 
normative beliefs on support for government responsibility were moderated by the level of social 
expenditure. The two strongest effects were found for authoritarianism (Figure 5.4a) and 
ethnocentrism (Figure 5.4b). As predicted, the positive effect of authoritarianism on support for 
government responsibility was stronger in countries with lower levels of welfare spending (e.g., 
Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey), compared to countries with higher levels 
of welfare spending (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden), even though 
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the slopes were positively significant for both contexts. In other words, in the (mostly ex-
communist) contexts characterized by a weak social state and high levels of social insecurity, 
authoritarianism was a stronger basis of welfare legitimacy than in (mostly) West European 
national contexts. Egalitarianism showed the same pattern as authoritarianism with a stronger 
positive relationship between egalitarianism and government responsibility in countries with low 
welfare expenditure (thereby qualifying the results of the regime analysis which yielded the 
strongest effect for the Nordic regime, though without formal comparisons of coefficients). 
Similarly, distrust was positively related to welfare support in countries with low welfare 
expenditure and unrelated to welfare support in countries with high welfare expenditure. At odds 
with our expectations, the impact of welfare dependency did not vary across countries, 
confirming the results of the regime analysis which also suggested that the normative 
differentiation between deserving and undeserving individuals represents a fairly uniform basis 
for rejecting welfare intervention across European countries. 
 
Figures 5.4a-c about here  
 
Ethnocentrism, in turn, did not predict government responsibility in countries with 
lower social expenditure, but had, as predicted, a negative effect on support for government 
responsibility in countries with higher levels of social expenditure. It thus appears that in national 
contexts where the state takes an important role in redistributing resources between citizens, a 
negative view of social diversity is linked to less support for government involvement. This is an 
important finding as it suggests that the importance of prejudice and ethnocentrism as 
delegitimizing forces of welfare states is contingent upon national contexts. It is interesting to 
note that although higher (mean) levels of ethnocentrism are generally found in East and Central 
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European countries, such exclusionary attitudes actually play a more powerful political role in 
defining welfare attitudes in (West European) countries with highly developed welfare states.  
Unemployment rate moderated the effect of all conceptions on support for government 
responsibility. Authoritarianism and egalitarianism were both more strongly related to 
government responsibility in countries with higher levels of unemployment (e.g. Spain, Slovakia, 
Turkey) than in countries with less unemployment (e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Switzerland). Welfare dependency had a stronger negative effect on government responsibility in 
countries with lower levels of unemployment, suggesting that the prevalence of unemployment 
attenuates the negative influence of perceived welfare dependency on welfare support. The 
delegitimizing role of welfare dependency is thus particularly common in relatively well-off 
contexts. Concerning distrust (Figure 5.4c), perceiving people as self-interested and 
untrustworthy was related to greater support for government responsibility in countries with high 
levels of unemployment, while no such link existed in countries with lower levels on 
unemployment. Finally, ethnocentrism was negatively related to welfare support in countries with 
low unemployment and unrelated to welfare attitudes in countries with higher unemployment. 
Again, attitudes toward foreigners play a more important role in determining welfare attitudes in 
relatively more privileged contexts characterized by low unemployment, compared to the less 
privileged contexts of high unemployment. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, we proposed a normative approach to welfare attitudes, based on the 
general idea that welfare attitudes are shaped by widespread normative beliefs which are anchored 
in citizens’ everyday experiences. We showed how five normative conceptions of social order—
authoritarianism, distrust, welfare dependency, ethnocentrism and egalitarianism—were called 
upon to support or on the contrary undermine the legitimacy of government responsibility in the 
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domain of social welfare and the protection of social rights. These shared beliefs are assumed to 
reflect the outcome of processes of differentiation and boundary definitions between social 
categories which are expressed in specific types of perceived cleavages in society: between good 
and bad people, between winners and losers, between immigrants and nationals, and between 
dominant and subordinate groups. 
In a first step, factor analyses confirmed the expected four-fold structure of 
conceptions of social order: Moral order (measured by authoritarianism and distrust), Free 
market (measured by welfare dependency), Social diversity (measured by ethnocentrism), and 
Structural inequality (measured by egalitarianism). The structure proposed by the model of lay 
conceptions of social order is thus relevant and applicable to comparative international data.  
Second, we investigated how level of education and perceived material vulnerability 
gave rise to the endorsement of normative models of social order. Individuals with lower levels 
of education systematically expressed greater endorsement of beliefs based on normative 
boundary drawing, and were thus more prone to perceive social cleavages. Respondents with 
lower levels of education were more authoritarian, more suspicious of fellow citizens, endorsed 
more strongly beliefs about the undeservingness of beneficiaries, and held more negative 
attitudes towards immigrants. At the same time, they were also more egalitarian. Material 
vulnerability, in turn, was less uniformly related to normative beliefs. A sense of risk and 
vulnerability gave rise to higher levels of social distrust, ethnocentrism and egalitarianism, but was 
unrelated to authoritarianism. In contrast to the low education group, materially vulnerable 
people perceived less welfare dependency than materially secure people. Individuals with material 
difficulties therefore seem more likely to be aware of the difficulties and life course risks faced by 
fellow citizens, they may live themselves on welfare benefits, or they may expect that one day 
they need to resort to welfare benefits. This awareness leads them to reject a label of welfare 
abusers for themselves or anyone else dependent on benefits. 
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Our third question concerned the nature of the relationship between social position, 
normative beliefs and welfare attitudes. The overall pattern that arose was clear. In line with prior 
research, members of low status groups, i.e., people with low levels of education and a strong 
sense of material vulnerability, females and older generations, were more supportive of social 
government responsibility. With respect to the normative beliefs, authoritarianism, distrust and 
egalitarianism led to greater support for government responsibility, while perceived welfare 
dependency and ethnocentrism were associated with less government involvement. The central 
normative foundations of welfare legitimacy were authoritarianism, welfare dependency and 
egalitarianism. These findings suggest that perceptions of a dangerous and immoral society where 
deviance and crime are perceived as a major social problem fuels support for social government 
intervention, while stigmatizing images of undeserving citizens undermine welfare legitimacy in 
virtually all European countries. Egalitarianism, in turn, justifies welfare intervention with the 
principle that excessive inequalities between dominant and subordinate groups are morally 
unacceptable. Mediation analyses confirmed that the impact of low social positions on the 
support for welfare intervention was to a considerable extent due to the endorsement of these 
normative beliefs. 
Interestingly, the normative differentiation between good and bad people 
(authoritarianism and distrust in the Moral order conception) and between deserving winners and 
undeserving losers (welfare dependency in the Free market conception) produced opposite 
effects for welfare legitimacy: social government intervention was seen as an appropriate solution 
for a society marred by lacking value conformity, suggesting that in many instances, people call 
for both social and repressive government functions in order to deal with life course difficulties. 
When endorsing the belief that free riders take advantage of the work of productive citizens, 
however, less rather than more government is the solution. Normative differentiation plays thus a 
key role, both in supporting and undermining welfare legitimacy.  
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On a more general level, our findings suggest that collective definitions of the 
boundaries of moral communities are a key factor in analyzing welfare legitimacy. Any 
implementation of justice principles raises the issue of the definition of the boundaries of moral 
communities, that is, the groups whose members are potential beneficiaries of resource allocation 
(Miller, 1999a; Opotow, 1990). Because they reflect strategies of boundary definition, perceived 
entitlements and stereotypical images of beneficiary groups become the normative basis of 
welfare legitimacy. Based on the model of lay conceptions of social order, we argue that the 
relationships between normative beliefs and support for government responsibility may illustrate 
different logics of defining the moral boundaries of welfare recipients. The link between distrust 
and government responsibility, for example, may indicate that perceived erosion of moral 
communities fuels calls for institutional regulation and protection, an interpretation supported by 
the strong association between distrust and material vulnerability. Egalitarianism, in turn, gives 
rise to an inclusive perception based on extending welfare coverage to those in disadvantaged 
living conditions. The negative relationship between welfare dependency and government 
responsibility points to a desire to exclude those who are seen as abusing the welfare system and 
profiting from others’ work. Ethnocentrism was related, although rather weakly, to lower support 
for general government involvement in ensuring social rights. This can be seen as a strategy of 
exclusion where immigrants are differentiated from the national ingroup and left outside the 
network of national solidarity. 
Such an interpretation of the results in terms of moral inclusion and exclusion is, 
however, limited by our operationalisation of the conceptions of social order. While the items 
provided by the ESS data set certainly tap into normative beliefs and allow testing our model, 
they do not explicitly ask about the inclusion or exclusion of specific groups in the sphere of 
welfare. Our interpretation in terms of moral boundaries is therefore based on the social 
psychological mechanism assumed to orient the way people reason about welfare. Further 
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research is needed that more explicitly measures the notion of moral communities and allows 
developing and specifying this aspect of differentiation and boundary definition. 
The fourth and final aim of the chapter was to map and explain the contextual, 
country-level variation of these normative beliefs as organizing principles of welfare attitudes. In 
a regime comparison approach, welfare dependency and egalitarianism emerged as consistent 
predictors of government intervention across welfare regime types. Authoritarianism played the 
greatest role in structuring attitudes in Eastern, Southern and continental-conservative regimes, 
while the exclusion of immigrants was mainly of importance in the Nordic regime (see Staerklé et 
al., 2010). Finally, distrust had opposite effects in the Eastern compared to the Nordic regime.  
Multilevel analyses showed that all the relationships between the five conceptions 
and welfare attitudes varied significantly across countries. In other words, normative beliefs did 
not have the same weight as predictors of policy attitudes across different national contexts. In 
countries with relatively low levels of welfare spending as well as in countries with higher levels 
of unemployment, the positive effects of authoritarianism, distrust and egalitarianism on welfare 
support were stronger than in countries with higher welfare spending and less unemployment. 
This finding suggests that in these predominantly ex-communist, East, Central and South 
European countries, welfare legitimacy is more strongly grounded, first, in a general conception 
of a strong and authoritarian state which is expected to regulate relations between citizens, and, 
second, in a principled belief concerning the unfairness of excessive social inequalities. The 
positive effect of distrust on government responsibility is striking since research on welfare 
legitimacy tends to assume the contrary relationship and to consider social trust an important 
foundation of welfare systems (Putnam, 1993; Rothstein, 1998). In contrast, we view individual 
distrust as a reflection of precarious life situations, characterized by a pessimistic, suspicious and 
victimizing outlook on life (Castel, 1995). From this perspective, institutionalized welfare 
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provisions and social government responsibility may represent a stable and reliable source of 
support which thereby becomes a way to cope with existential insecurity and vulnerability. 
The patterns were less clear for ethnocentrism and welfare dependency, but 
significant cross-level interactions allow us to conclude that the negative effects of ethnocentrism 
on welfare support were stronger in countries with higher levels of welfare spending and lower 
levels of unemployment. In other words, negative attitudes towards immigrants are a key factor 
in the delegitimizing of welfare states mainly in West European countries. The negative effect of 
welfare dependency on welfare support, too, was stronger in contexts characterized by lower 
levels of unemployment. Overall, however, the role of welfare dependency in delegitimizing 
welfare intervention seems to be more uniform across European countries than the role of the 
other normative beliefs.  
Social expenditure and level of unemployment thus turned out to be important 
moderators of the social processes underlying welfare legitimacy. In general, these findings then 
point towards the importance of social conditions in countries in understanding the normative 
foundations of the social legitimacy of welfare state arrangements.  
An important limit of our contextual analysis regards the choice of country-level 
variables. We chose to focus on social expenditure because we wanted to show how boundary 
definition strategies were affected by the level of welfare provision in a country (which they 
clearly did, as our results have shown). Unemployment, in turn, was chosen since it should affect 
personal awareness of social risk and uncertainty, and thus also moderate strategies of normative 
boundary definition. Future research could also incorporate country-level measures of the 
dominant normative context or ideological climate, measured for example by aggregating 
individual-level attitude data (Sarrasin et al., 2011, in preparation). People are likely to be aware of 
the dominant norms prevalent in their societies and disseminated through media and public 
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discourse. Such country-level norms may prove to be powerful context level influences on 
people’s positioning towards welfare attitudes.  
It is a matter of debate whether the country-level variables used in this study (and in 
other chapters) truly capture something unique about the context and allow identifying 
characteristics of the national context that in themselves explain cross-national differences in 
belief-attitude relationships. A different interpretation of our cross-level interactions is that rather 
than levels of social expenditure and unemployment explaining the differences, such variation 
would be related to more general country profiles or regimes. For example, we can question 
whether the more strongly positive effect of authoritarianism on welfare support in countries 
with lower levels of welfare expenditure is truly related to social spending or has rather something 
to do with the fact that most countries with low social spending in our sample are former 
Communist or Southern countries with a history of authoritarian regimes. Our chapter gives no 
final answer to whether the multilevel approach is fundamentally superior to the regime 
approach. The two approaches might be best conceived of as complementary rather than 
competing, in particular since the multilevel approach allows specifying some relations that would 
remain unnoticed on a regime level.  
In sum, the approach advocated in this chapter highlights the importance of 
motivations other than self-interest in explaining citizen attitudes towards government and social 
rights. Sharing beliefs which give meaning to everyday experiences, differentiating oneself from 
others, drawing boundaries between one’s group and other groups, as well as participating in the 
construction of social order through the endorsement of normative beliefs are such motivations 
explaining citizen attitudes. Our basic goal was thereby to propose an account of social 
psychological processes at work in the construction of welfare attitudes. Our results 
demonstrated that such processes are not universal, but rather moderated by the institutional and 
normative contexts in which they are enacted. The normative beliefs held by individuals 
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embedded in social groups thus become key elements for understanding the psychology of 
welfare attitudes.
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Table 5.1 Model of lay conceptions of social order 
 
Social identity Social position 
  Normative differentiation 
Conception MORAL ORDER FREE MARKET 
Principle of categorization Morality Productivity 
Core antagonisms “Good” & “Bad” “Winners” & “Losers” 
Principle of social regulation Conformity, Similarity Equity, Self-Interest 
Welfare policies 
Private support, 
Charity 
Private responsibility, 
Insurance 
Normative belief Authoritarianism, Distrust Welfare dependency 
  Categorical differentiation 
Conception SOCIAL DIVERSITY 
STRUCTURAL 
INEQUALITY 
Principle of categorization Social heterogeneity Social class, status 
Core antagonisms Majority & Minority Dominants & Subordinates 
Principle of social regulation Intergroup differentiation Inequality management 
Welfare policies 
Majority favoritism vs. 
Group rights 
Elite favoritism vs. 
Redistribution 
Normative beliefs 
Ethnocentrism vs. 
Multiculturalism 
Social dominance vs. 
Egalitarianism 
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Table 5.2  Five measures of conceptions of social order, with descriptive statistics for overall 
sample 
Conception Indicator (scale) Item M SD N 
Moral order Authoritarianism 
(1-5) 
Terrorist suspect in prison until police 
satisfied 
4.08 .99 53300 
  Schools teach children obey authority 4.06 .94 54603 
  People who break the law much harsher 
sentences 
3.97 .97 53736 
 Distrust  You can’t be too careful 5.32 2.58 54786 
 (0-10) Most people try to take advantage of you 4.73 2.47 54360 
  People mostly look out for themselves 5.47 2.45 54626 
      
Free market Welfare  Social benefits make people lazy 2.97 1.14 53374 
 dependency 
(1-5) 
Social benefits make people less willing 
care for one another 
2.90 1.09 52778 
  Social benefits make people less willing 
look after themselves/family 
2.78 1.08 52773 
  Most unemployed people do not really try 
to find a job 
3.05 1.11 53770 
  Employees often pretend they are sick to 
stay at home 
3.02 1.09 51484 
      
Social diversity Ethnocentrism  Immigration bad for country's economy 5.21 2.49 51762 
 (0-10) Country's cultural life undermined by 
immigrants 
4.65 2.61 51801 
  Immigrants make country worse place to 
live 
5.25 2.36 51532 
      
Structural 
inequality 
Egalitarianism 
(1-5) 
For a society to be fair, differences in 
standard of living should be small 
3.72 .97 53799 
 
 
 
45 
 
Table 5.3 Multilevel analysis:  Level-1 Main Effects of Social Positions and Conceptions on 
Welfare Attitudes 
 Government responsibility 
 M2a 
Social Positions 
M2b  
Conceptions 
 B SE B SE 
Level 1     
Intercept 76.96*** (1.11) 77.17*** (1.11) 
Social Position      
Age .63*** (.07) .28*** (.07) 
Female 1.36*** (.14) .95*** (.13) 
Education -1.20*** (.08) -.84*** (.08) 
Material Vulnerability 1.34*** (.08) 1.01*** (.08) 
Conceptions     
Authoritarianism   2.42*** (.08) 
Distrust   .53*** (.08) 
Welfare Dependency   -3.24*** (.07) 
Ethnocentrism   -.30*** (.08) 
Egalitarianism   3.27*** (.07) 
Level 2     
∆-2 log likelihood (df)  824.2(4)*** 5092.5(5)*** 
Note. Dependent variable scale ranges from 0 to 100. All predictor variables (except gender) are standardized. -2 Log Likelihood 
difference for the M2a model is calculated in comparison to the intercept only model. -2 Log Likelihood difference for the M2b 
model is calculated in comparison to the M2a model. 
* = p < .05. ** = p < .01. *** = p < .001. 
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Table 5.4 Multilevel analysis: Cross-Level Interactions between Conceptions and Level-2 
Indicators on Welfare Attitudes 
  Government 
responsibility 
  B SE 
Level 2 Indicator Level 1 Conception   
Social Expenditure * Authoritarianism -.94** (.33) 
 Distrust -.66** (.22) 
 Welfare dependency -.11 (.21) 
 Ethnocentrism -.70** (.23) 
 Egalitarianism -.53* (.21) 
    
Unemployment  Rate * Authoritarianism .75* (.34) 
 Distrust .60* (.23) 
 Welfare dependency .40* (.19) 
 Ethnocentrism .60* (.24) 
 Egalitarianism .46* (.22) 
Note. The cross-level interaction models are compared to their respective random-slope models. Underlined 
interaction effects are depicted in figures 5.4a-c. 
*= p < .05. ** = p < .01. *** = p < .001. 
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Figure 5.1 Mediation model of welfare attitudes 
 
 
d 
c 
b 
a 
Social position  
(Education, Vulnerability) 
Normative belief  
(Moral order, Free Market, Social diversity, Structural inequality) 
Welfare attitude  
(Government responsibility) 
National context  
(Social expenditure, 
unemployment, migration rate) 
Level-2 
Level-1 
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Figure 5.2 Normative beliefs mediate the link between social position and welfare attitudes 
 
*** = p < .001
Figure 5.3 Predicting government responsibility as a function of conceptions of social 
order across five welfare regimes 
 
 
Note. Regression coefficients are standardized, and controlled for age, gender, and country within each regime 
cluster. 
* = p < .001, + = p < .05.
Figures 5.4a-c. Cross-level interactions on Government responsibility 
 
 
 
